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Book Review  
Johann Michel, Quand le social vient au sens (Bruxelles: 
PIE Peter Lang, 2015) 
In Quand le social vient au sens, Johann Michel engages in a dialogue 
between hermeneutics, social phenomenology, historiography and various 
non-phenomenological currents within contemporary French sociology. The 
author proposes to see this collection of exquisitely well-written essays, all 
of which were previously published separately, as unified by a common 
hermeneutic interrogation about the historical and social sciences. The book 
is divided into three parts, each consisting of three chapters. I will first 
outline the contents of the book and then raise two inter-related problems 
concerning social theory. 
The first part discusses Ricoeur’s views on the epistemology and the 
“regional ontology” of historiography. These are quite technical chapters in 
which Michel impressively deploys his vast knowledge of Ricoeur’s work. 
The chapters are less concerned with historiographical research as such than 
with epistemological and ontological problems that are fundamental from a 
philosophical point of view.  
The second part of the collection, entitled Inhabiting and Resisting 
Institutions, begins with a commentary on Ricoeur’s conception of human 
institutions, continues with a polyphonic discussion on the regional 
ontology of human institutions to which contemporary French sociology is 
convoked, and ends with a “micro-sociological” case study, based on Primo 
Levi’s account of Nazi camp life, highlighting the irreducible human power 
to negotiate and resist even the most oppressive institutions.  
Michel carefully demonstrates that Ricoeur’s political and ontological 
thought on institutions remains ambivalent. On the one hand, in a classical 
holistic manner, Ricoeur thinks of institutions as objects “always already” 
there; institutions predate individual subjects, or more precisely, precede 
and enable their subjectivation in the first place. But, on the other hand, 
institutions are held to be reducible to intersubjective exchanges, which 
reveals the ultimately individualistic framework of Ricoeur’s social 
ontology. This ontological “tension” finds its reflection on the political 
plane, with Ricoeur arguing both that individual freedom is irreducible and, 
in the opposite direction, that allegiance to political institutions is 
irrevocable.  
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Michel successfully engages a dialogue between philosophy and 
sociology in the second chapter of this section, which is dedicated to 
problems of social ontology and genuinely informed by non-philosophical 
sources. Not only Ricoeur, but also Schütz and Berger/Luckmann form the 
backdrop of Michel’s contribution to this dialogue. The author contends that 
the way in which various currents of contemporary French sociology deal 
with institutional phenomena in terms of structures or grammars is 
compatible with a hermeneutical focus on the “textual configuration of 
institutions.” (p. 94). But he warns that the inevitably synchronic or static 
emphases of the notions of structure and grammar should not prevent the 
analyst from problematizing the origin of institutions, an important point on 
which I will elaborate in the discussion below. 
The third part of the book deals with the social conditions of 
subjectivation, that is, the cultural resources through which human 
individuals come to think of themselves and act in the world as subjects. The 
first chapter compares Ricoeur’s and Foucault’s approaches regarding the 
relationship between subjectivity and truth, opposing the former’s insistence 
on testimony (témoignage) to the latter’s concentration on avowal (aveu) as 
alternative modes of veridiction. For the rest, the second chapter clarifies the 
notion of inability, again in genuine dialogue with sociology, whereas the 
third and final chapter develops the thesis that narrativity is a fundamental 
mode of understanding and interpreting the self, or in other words, that it is 
an “existential.” 
I now want to address two important problems that the book brings to 
the surface. The “tension” that Michel clearly demonstrates at work in 
Ricoeur’s social thought refers to the commitment to two apparently 
incompatible theses, namely, that institutions predate the constitution of 
people as subjects, though they are not entities that can be added on to the 
people. I read this as a characteristic attitude of social theory during the 
period in which Ricoeur reflected on the nature of the social. That attitude 
conjoins ontological individualism and methodological holism: the “stuff” of 
the social is supposed to be nothing but individuals in interaction; but at the 
same time holistic concepts prove powerful, while individualistic concepts 
prove utterly helpless, to advance enlightening analyses of the social world. 
In this view, social units such as institutions should not be reified, that is, 
treated as entities or “substances” separate from people’s actions, though 
there seems to be no practical way to analyse them without invoking, 
explicitly or tacitly, irreducible “structures” or “systems” endowed with 
constraining powers over individual actions. The question facing social 
theory today is whether or not we should content ourselves with this tension 
between our individualistic ontology and our holistic method.  
One way out, which is fully compatible with Michel’s (and Ricoeur’s) 
approach, is to acknowledge that social structures, since they exert causal 
powers on people, do exist, though not in the way that observable empirical 
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units like people exist. This points to a stratified view of social reality. In this 
regard, it would be advisable, as Michel occasionally does, to acknowledge 
that it is not institutions but the structural properties of “institutional 
phenomena” that are the proper object of sociology. The talk of institutions 
is confusing because it connotes the very substance that it wishes to discard. 
Instead, institutional phenomena can be conceptualized as resulting from 
the interaction between different strata of reality, such as social structure, 
culture, and people. Structural facts, such as role systems, and cultural facts, 
such as shared meanings, could also be usefully distinguished in the 
analysis of institutional phenomena. 
This brings me to the second point I wish to discuss, namely, Michel’s 
legitimate protestation that sociologists focusing on structures or grammars, 
which are by definition synchronic arrangements, unduly neglect their 
diachronic formation or historicity. In my view, Michel is right to diagnose 
that sociologists’ inability to account for the historical origin of social 
structures stems from methodological helplessness, and that the latter is 
never a good reason, and always a bad excuse, for endorsing or rejecting any 
ontological position. What most sociologists are unable to do indeed is to 
analyze the interaction between social structures and people, assuming as 
they do that either structures mechanically determine people’s doings or 
structures are “just” what people do. Focusing on subjectivation and 
interpretation, Michel suggests a non-reductive, stratified method for 
analyzing how social and cultural structures shape people and vice-versa. 
Quand le social vient au sens will thus be of interest for specialists of 
Ricoeur’s work, epistemologists of historiography, social theorists, and 
students of subjectivation processes. 
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